Abstract
Introduction
The Mafias, which are considered to be the most sophisticated form of criminal organization, also run businesses in the lawful economic sphere in which they usually invest proceeds from illicit trafficking (money laundering). Legally registered Mafia firms (LMFs), according to criminologists' terminology, can be defined as firms that are legally registered and apparently engage in lawful activities but are owned by a Mafia family (Champeyrache, 2004) . LMFs differ from lawful firms (LWFs) in three main ways (Gambetta, 1993; Fantò, 1999) : the owners are members of a criminal organization; funding partially or totally comes from illegal activities; and criminal methods involving violence, intimidation or corruption might be used while doing business. Legal and illegal activities are therefore closely intertwined within LMFs as the legal activities mostly serve to launder profits stemming from illegal ones (Fantò, 1999) .
In this study we examine a sample of 198 Italian legally registered firms defined as LMFs due to having been confiscated at some point by judicial authorities, in relation to alleged connections of their owners with Italian organized crime. In particular, we first analyze whether accounting information of LMFs embeds some significant differences from that of similar firms for which there is no evidence of criminal connection (LWFs). Based on the identified differences, we develop a logistic regression model that can contribute to detecting LMFs and find practical application in forensic accounting. Among the different financial variables we test to predict criminal connections, we particularly focus on earnings management (EM) proxies. Indeed, the large amount of research on EM carried out thus far indicates that managers discretionally manage earnings for different purposes using a wide variety of methods. Specifically, they carry out special transactions, so-called real activities manipulation (RM) , that usually affect firm's operating activities, expenses and cash flows from operations (CFO) (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006) and manipulate discretionary accruals (accrual-based EM) with no CFO impact (e.g., Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 2010) . Hence, in this study we examine both methods of EM as well as developing some new proxies for EM in order to reflect specific characteristics of LMFs.
As far as we know there are no previous studies in the literature that seek to develop an accounting detection model of LMFs. Nonetheless, considering the supposed fraudulent purposes of LMFs such as money laundering and tax evasion we refer to previous studies that develop prediction models of financial statement frauds and related manipulations using financial and non-financial variables (Beneish, 1997; Summers and Sweeney, 1998; Lee et al., 1999; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Erickson et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2008; Brazel et al., 2009; Dechow et al., 2011; Perols and Lougee, 2011) . A main difference between LMFs and firms committing financial statement fraud examined in previous research is that in the former the fraudulent purpose is genetic and strictly related to their existence, whereas in the latter fraud is subsequently committed due to specific circumstances.
Overall, our results reveal that our detection model is able to correctly classify 76.41% of firms within a matched sample of 852 firm-year observations including LMFs and LWFs. More specifically, our model detects 76.29% of LMFs (sensitivity) and 76.53% of LWFs (specificity). Out-of-sample tests confirm the robustness of the predictions and an additional analysis shows that undetected LMFs are significantly larger than detected LMFs. Additionally, consistent with previous studies (Beneish, 1997; Dechow et al., 2011) on fraud prediction, our model shows that unadjusted specific accruals have more predictive power than discretionary accruals and a specific RM proxy such as abnormal material expenses is also a significant predictor of criminal connections.
Our study contributes to the accounting literature given that, to our knowledge, it is the first to develop an accounting detection model of LMFs. More importantly, our paper can aid practitioners and regulators in identifying accounting signals that can be used in risk assessment models or in the detection of criminal infiltrations and related illicit practices. Furthermore, our study shows that analysis of specific accruals and RM proxies may provide more insight into EM patterns of LMFs. Finally, it contributes to research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) (e.g., Jenkins, 2006; Guthrie and Durand, 2008; Carroll and Shabana, 2010) , indicating that socially irresponsible firms, such as LMFs, tend to engage more in EM.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 introduces LMFs; section 3 reviews related research; section 4 describes the research design and sample data; section 5 presents empirical results and their discussion; section 6 includes concluding remarks.
Legally Registered Mafia Firms
For the purpose of this study, we define "organized crime" according to the legal provision of the article 416-bis of the Italian criminal code. Specifically, art. 416-bis states that:
"A mafia-type association consists of three or more individuals and those who belong to it make use of the power of intimidation afforded by the associative bond and the state of subjugation and criminal silence which derives from it to commit crimes, to acquire directly or indirectly the management or control of economic activities, concessions, authorizations or public contracts and services, either to gain unjust profits or advantages for themselves or for others, or to prevent or obstruct the free exercise of the vote, or to procure votes for themselves or to others at a time or electoral consultation".
Criminal organizations take on new businesses in order to invest and launder significant financial resources coming from illegal activities. In this way, criminal organizations achieve high profits and social consensus by ensuring employment and income for the population in the areas where they exercise control of the territory. Fantò (1999) suggests that the main trait of LMFs is not the type of business run but the nature of the capital accumulation process that led to their formation as well as the strength of intimidation on which they are hinged. This mafia-style intimidation is a source of surplus value and competitive advantages of LMFs over LWFs. Arlacchi (1983) identifies the following competitive advantages of the LMFs over the LWFs: discouragement of competition (securing goods and raw materials at favorable prices, as well as orders, contracts and commercial outlets using criminal intimidation); wage compression (evasion of social security contributions and insurance, non-payment of overtime, denial of trade union rights); availability of financial resources (investment of huge proceeds coming from illegal activities without bearing the cost of credit).
After the first instance of court confiscation LMFs are entrusted to one or more legal administrators. The legal administration is an institution designed to reinstate the legality, protect and manage confiscated LMFs and avoid their progressive impoverishment. The body currently in charge of the administration and assignment of LMFs definitively confiscated is the Italian agency Agenzia Nazionale Beni Sequestrati e Confiscati (ANBSC).
Related Research

Financial Statement Fraud
In order to identify the most predictive variables of our detection model of LMFs, we mainly refer to previous studies which develop prediction models of financial statement frauds and related manipulations using financial and non-financial variables.
In this regard, Beneish (1997 Beneish ( , 1999 estimates a model for detecting earnings manipulation violating generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) using financial statement variables.
He finds a positive relation between aggregate accruals and likelihood of fraud, confirming Dechow et al.'s (1996) previous finding. Beneish (1999) considers that a limitation of the model is that it is estimated using financial information for publicly traded companies and cannot be reliably used to study privately-held firms. Lee et al. (1999) subsequently find that the excess of earnings over CFO (income increasing accruals) is significantly greater for a sample of 56 firms committing financial statement fraud relative to a broad control sample of non-fraud firms. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) (2011), using a sample of 54 fraud and 54 non-fraud firms, show that fraud firms are more likely to have managed earnings in prior years through discretionary accruals. Finally, Dechow et al. (2011) analyze the characteristics of firms investigated by the SEC for misstating earnings on various dimensions and find that, at the time of misstatements, accrual quality is low, both financial and nonfinancial measures of performance are deteriorating and financing activities and related offbalance-sheet activities are much more likely.
Earnings Management within LMFs
In most of the aforementioned studies EM, measured by several proxies, is a significant variable of the prediction model of financial statement frauds. Hence, we expect EM pattern, including both accrual-based EM and RM, to be significantly different between LMFs and LWFs. In particular, we examine both types of EM activities because recent studies suggest that firms choose between the two mechanisms using the technique that is less costly to them (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012) . In this regard, RM, as a departure from optimal operational decisions, is unlikely to increase firms' long-term value. Hence, some managers might find RM particularly costly because their firms face intense competition in the industry (Zang, 2012) . However, these considerations may not be applicable to LMFs which usually face a weak market competition and benefit from significant competitive advantages (Arlacchi, 1983; Fantò, 1999) . Additional reasons may lead LMFs to engage in EM practices more than LWFs do. First, RM can be used to permanently reduce taxable income, even more effectively than accrual-based EM, by fraudulently removing certain cash flows from the balance sheets. Second, money laundering may require recording fictitious transactions that may lead to EM pattern detected in our proxies. Third, the great availability of financial resources stemming from illegal activities may reduce the need of bank financing and the related incentive to avoid EM practices in order to exhibit an acceptable earnings quality. Finally, a more intensive EM in LMFs may be fostered by the low level of scrutiny from outsiders of these firms compared to LWFs, in connection with the protection ensured by their criminal ties and infiltrators in all spheres of political and institutional life of the country. In this aspect, some analogy might be found with the case of politically connected firms studied by Chaney et al. (2011) which engage more in EM than firms lacking such connections. Additionally, previous studies find that a low external monitoring intensity is associated with a higher level of EM (Duellman et al., 2013; Wongsunwai, 2013) .
Earnings Management and Corporate Social Responsibility
A further indication on the different EM pattern between LMFs and LWFs may come from some previous research on the relation between CSR and EM. Indeed, LMFs can be assumed to be socially irresponsible based on the widely accepted Carroll's (1979) definition of CSR implying that, in order to meet social expectations, CSR firms work to make a profit, obey the law, behave ethically, and be a good corporate citizen by financially supporting worthy social causes (Carroll, 1991) .
In practice, previous studies use a variety of methods to measure CSR. Some of these methods are: reputation indices or databases such as The Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) database (Waddock, 2003; Hong and Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012) which rates US listed companies based on several social dimensions; corporate crime (Davidson and Worrell, 1990;  Baucus and Baucus, 1997) and tax avoidance (Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Dowling, 2013) indicators; content analysis of corporate publications on practices regarding environmental, community, employee, and consumer issues (Gray et al., 1995; Turker, 2009) ; scales measuring the CSR perceptions and values of managers (Singhapakdi et al., 1996; Ruf et al., 1998; Quazi and O'Brien, 2000) ; scales considering the extent to which businesses meet the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities imposed on them by their stakeholders (Maignan and Ferrell, 2000; Turker, 2009 ).
We do not directly measure CSR in LMFs. Nonetheless, the CSR measures applied in previous research support our assumption on the social irresponsibility of LMFs. It is noteworthy that previous studies provide inconsistent evidence with mixed implications on the relation between CSR and EM (Chih et al., 2008; Prior et al., 2008; Gargouri et al., 2010; Hong and Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Shafer, 2013) . Hence, in this study we aim to provide additional insight into this relation.
Research Design
Variable Definition
Consistent with previous studies on business failure prediction (Dambolena and Khoury, 1980; Karels and Prakash, 1987; Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006; Åstebro and Winter, 2012) , we explore a wide range of financial characteristics of LMFs as well as their EM behavior in order to build the best detection model.
Earnings Management Variables
Prior studies (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Zang, 2012) use different proxies for RM including: abnormal levels of CFO, abnormal productions costs, abnormal discretionary expenses (R&D, advertising, and selling, general, and administrative expenditures). In Italy legal format of income statement classifies expenses by nature rather than by function and production costs cannot be distinguished from discretionary expenditures. Therefore, we adopt three new measures of RM as well as the usual abnormal CFO (ABCFO): abnormal material expenses (ABMAT), including both raw materials and trading goods, abnormal service expenses (ABSERV) and abnormal personnel expenses (ABPER).
In LMFs we expect higher ABMAT due to fraudulent sales underreporting and the record of fictitious transactions with related parties in order to disguise money laundering and evade taxes. Furthermore, we expect lower ABPER due to wage compression practices (Arlacchi, 1983 ) including evasion of social security contributions. Finally, we expect lower ABSERV given that LMFs may be less prone to contract external services (advertising, consultancy, maintenance etc.) because of their aforementioned competitive advantages.
As a measure of accrual-based EM we calculate discretionary aggregate accruals (DAC), discretionary revenue accruals (DREV) and a new measure of discretionary expense accruals (DEXP). Indeed, we consider that LMFs may simultaneously manipulate revenues and expenses and the related cumulative effect may not be detected in aggregate discretionary accrual models which do not provide information as to which components of earnings firms manage and how the EM is achieved (Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004) .
Previous studies find that discretionary accrual models have less power to identify manipulation than unadjusted accrual measures supplemented with other financial statement ratios (Beneish, 1997; Dechow et al., 2011) . Hence, we additionally test in our model, deflated by lagged total assets, unadjusted aggregate accruals (ACCR) and some unadjusted specific accruals that are more likely to be manipulated such as: change in receivables (CH_REC), change in inventory (CH_INV) and change in payables (CH_PAY). Following the same reasoning for accrual-based EM we also examine unadjusted proxies for RM by including in our model personnel, material and service expenses deflated by lagged total assets in order to determine whether they show more predictive power than commonly used abnormal RM measures.
Other Variables
Besides accrual-based EM and RM measures we test in our model the following variables, grouped by category, used in prior works on fraudulent financial statements and adapted to the singularities of LMFs. et al., 1989; Persons, 1995; Summer and Sweeney, 1998; Beneish, 1999; Dechow et al., 2011) examine asset composition with special regard to receivables and inventories that can be an easy target for manipulation due to the subjective judgment involved in their valuation. Accordingly, we measure asset composition with variables CATA (current assets/total assets), RECTA (receivables/total assets), INVTA (inventory/total assets) and INTA (intangible assets/total assets). In comparison with LWFs in the same industry, we expect LMFs to exhibit higher receivables to account for incoming dirty money and lower inventory to avoid taxes (VAT and income tax) through stock underreporting and fictitious purchase transactions.
Asset composition. Previous studies (Loebbecke
Performance. We examine some variables expressing the reported firm financial performance and try to detect inconsistencies and signals of possible fraudulent manipulations.
In particular, previous fraud research finds that firms that increase revenue fraudulently are more likely to have abnormally high sales growth rates (Erickson et al., 2006; Brazel et al., 2009) . As firms use resources to generate sales, unusual relations between sales and resources used, such as assets (capital productivity) and employees (labor productivity) may be a signal of fraud. Therefore, in line with previous studies (Fanning and Cogger, 1998; Perols and Lougee, 2011), we include Revenue to Assets (REVTA) and Revenue to Employee (REVEMPL) as predictors in our model. We predict a negative relation between REVTA and probability of criminal connection (CRIME) given that in LMFs revenue may be underreported for tax evasion and there may be a need to quickly overinvest in assets financial resources coming from illicit sources without demanding an immediate competitive return. On the other hand, higher values of REVEMPL for LMFs relative to LWFs may be due not only to a fraudulent revenue manipulation but also to the underreporting of the number of employees because of the employment of undeclared workers.
We additionally test Return on Assets (ROA) as a predictor given that we expect LMFs to be less profitable than LWFs. Indeed, LMFs may downward manage earnings to avoid tax as well as being oversized and poorly managed. Change in ROA (ABS_CH_ROA) is also added following Dechow et al. (2011) although, differently from the latter, we consider the absolute value in order to reflect higher opportunistic profitability fluctuations not reflecting the actual business performance. In accordance with this higher volatility pattern in LMFs, we furthermore include and expect higher values for absolute changes in percentages of personnel (ABS_CH_PERSREV), material (ABS_CH_MATREV) and service expenses (ABS_CH_SERVREV) over sales and absolute changes in net income (ABS_CH_NI) and CFO (ABS_CH_CFO) deflated by lagged total assets.
In line with previous fraud research (Fanning and Cogger, 1998; Summers and Sweeney, 1998; Beneish, 1999; Lee et al., 1999) we additionally include the annual absolute change in the ratio receivables to sales (ABS_CH_RECREV) also called days' sales in receivables. A significant variation in days' sales in receivables could be the result of a change in credit policy but it may also be suggestive of a fraudulent revenue manipulation (Beneish, 1999). As we expect revenue manipulation to be either upwards or downwards we consider the absolute value of ratio variation. In order to detect a possible simultaneous expense manipulation, we also add a variable for the absolute change in payables to purchases (ABCH_PAY_EXP).
Debt.
As regards the indebtedness, we expect a positive relation between leverage (LEV) (total liabilities/total assets) and CRIME. LMFs may be more indebted than LWFs because they may report fictitious business transactions or may obtain favorable payment terms from suppliers using the strength of criminal intimidation (Arlacchi, 1983; Fantò, 1999) . More specifically, LMFs may prefer fictitious debt transactions to inject dirty money since regular contributions of capital from shareholders may raise suspicions on their origins. Nonetheless, we expect LMFs to show less bank indebtedness (LEVBANK) compared to the rest of LWFs because their access to alternative illegal source of funding may replace bank support.
Liquidity. Regarding liquidity we include current ratio (CRATIO: current assets/current liabilities) (Shih et al., 2011) and the absolute value of its annual change (ABS_CH_CRATIO).
We expect a worse and more fluctuating liquidity situation for LMFs given that current assets and liabilities balances may include fictitious fraudulent transactions, undermining the adequacy of these ratios to reflect the actual short-term debt-paying ability of the firms.
Growth. Previous research finds that the fast growth of a firm is an important warning of financial information fraud (Loebbecke et al., 1989; Beasley, 1996; Bell and Carcello, 2000; Shih et al., 2011) . Consistently, we include percentage increase of total assets (GROWTH) as a predictor in our model. Indeed, we expect LMFs to have a higher growth rate than LWFs because of the continuous investment of financial resources stemming from illegal activities. et al. (2011) we add a measure of difference of percentage change in total assets less percentage change in number of employees (DIF_GROWTH_EMPL) under the assumption that physical assets and employees are complements and should follow a similar growth pattern. We expect this measure to be significantly lower for LMFs because, although they may overinvest to launder dirty money, a sustained underreporting of number of employees may result in higher fluctuations in the number of employees and higher employee growth rates. Lastly, we include personnel expenses per employee (PERSEMPL) expecting a lower value for LMFs due not only to lower remunerations but also to the payment of undeclared envelope wages (Williams, 2009).
Non-financial. Following Dechow
Earnings Management Variable Construction
We need to build measures of accrual-based EM and RM to input as independent variables in our prediction model. Hence, we calculate discretionary accruals (DAC) as the residuals from the following Eq. (1) based on the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) with a control for performance (Kothari et al., 2005) :
Where in year t (or t -1), ACCR denotes total accruals; TA, ∆REV, ∆AR, PPE, and ROA represent total assets, changes in net revenue, changes in accounts receivables, property, plant,
and equipment, and return on assets, respectively. Parameters of Eq. (1) are estimated crosssectionally for each industry-year with at least 15 observations in order to control for industrywide changes under different economic conditions (Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999 ) that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Kasznik, 1999) . We use all active firms in AIDA (excluding LMFs) which are not listed on the stock exchange and with financial statements available for 10 years from 2003 to 2012.
Consistent with previous studies of EM (Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) , 
Where ∆AP represents change in accounts payables.
Furthermore, we calculate the abnormal level of material expenses (ABMAT) and personnel expenses (ABPER) as the estimated residual of the following model adopted by Roychowdhury (2006) for production costs:
Where MATt and PERt are respectively material expenses and personnel expenses in year t that we assume mostly related to production; St is the net sales in year t; and ∆St is the change in net sales from year t-1 to t (St -St-1). Eq. (5) is estimated in the same way as DAC.
Additionally, we estimate the abnormal level of service expenses (ABSERV) as the residual from the following Eq. (6) used by Roychowdhury (2006) for discretionary expenses and estimated in the same way as DAC:
Finally, in line with Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) we estimate abnormal CFO (ABCFO) as the residual from the following Eq. (7) estimated in the same way as DAC:
Detection Model
In order to build our detection model we start with the estimation of the following logistic regression model (Eq. 8) where the dependent dummy variable CRIME takes a value of 1 for LMFs and 0 for LWFs:
Pr (CRIME) = f (EM variables, Asset composition variables, Performance variables, Debt variables, Liquidity variables, Growth variable, Nonfinancial variables)
Following a similar approach adopted by Dechow et al. (2011) for prediction of accounting misstatements, we group the variables in different categories. Table 1 describes the independent variables and their calculation, classifies them by category and indicates their predicted sign as previously discussed.
(Insert Table 1 In addition, we include firms confiscated in first instance and found in AIDA database (118) and online newspapers (52) In order to build our full sample for the model estimate, we use a matched sample design (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Perry and Williams, 1994; Defond and Subramanyam, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998; Kothari et al., 2005) . Specifically, we match each LMF-year with a LWFyear on fiscal reporting year, industry and size proxied by total assets. Table 6 approximately here)
Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis
We estimate a cross-sectional logistic regression to determine whether the variables examined in univariate tests are jointly significant in detecting LMF-years. We use a stepwise backward elimination technique to arrive at a parsimonious model that best predicts LMFs within our sample. The model is displayed in Table 7 .
(Insert Table 7 approximately here)
The chi-square test indicates the significance of the overall model. As showed at the bottom of the Table 7 , using a probability cut-off point of 0.50 the model correctly classifies 76.29% of the total LMF-years (sensitivity) and 76.53% of the total LWF-years (specificity) with a total rate of 76.41 firm-years correctly classified. Similar to previous studies (Lisowsky, 2010; Dimmock and Gerken, 2012; Åstebro and Winter, 2012) , to illustrate the possible tradeoffs between false positives and correctly predicted LMFs at various probability cutoff-points, Fig. 2 shows the graph of sensitivity and specificity for each probability cut-off point for the detection model of Table 7 . A reduction of the cut-off from 0.50 to 0.35 scores a sensitivity of approximately 90% and a specificity of approximately 60%. Indeed, considering the higher misclassification cost for LMFs relative to LWFs, reducing the cut-off point from 0.5 might be a convenient option.
(Insert Figure 2 approximately here)
Turning to the results of the estimated detection model in Table 7 , it is noteworthy that, within the accrual-based EM variables, coefficients on CH_REC and CH_INV are negative and significant (p<0.05) supporting previous studies which find that unadjusted specific accruals have more power to identify fraudulent manipulations than discretionary accruals (Beneish, 1997; Dechow et al., 2011) . The former are thus preferable because of the fewer calculation efforts they require. Regarding variable ABMAT, its coefficient is positive and significant (p<0.01), as expected, providing evidence that LMFs are more likely to upward manage material expenses than LWFs do. On the other hand, positive and significant (p<0.01) coefficient on INTA and negative and significant (p<0.05) coefficient on INVTA respectively suggest that LMFs are more likely to report higher intangible assets and lower inventory with respect to total assets.
As far as performance variables are concerned, coefficient on REVTA is negative and significant (p<0.01) as expected. Furthermore, negative and significant (p<0.01) coefficient on SERVREV suggests lower service expenses with respect to sales in LMFs. For the rest of variables of the models, the results of univariate tests are mostly confirmed and the same considerations apply. Some exceptions are variables ABS_CH_MATREV and ABS_CH_NI whose coefficients are not significant at conventional levels in spite of improving the predictive power of the model. Another exception is the variable REVEMPL whose coefficient is positive and significant (p<0.05) apparently suggesting a higher labor productivity in LMFs relative to
LWFs. Nonetheless, we are more inclined to believe that this result is mainly due to the underreporting of number of employees.
Finally, Table 8 shows the illicit activities which may be reflected by the variables included in the final detection model. Our analysis is mostly based on the assumptions made in the variable definition section 4.1. Money laundering as well as labor, income and value added tax evasion are assumed to be the primary incentives which should be considered whether additional variables are included in the model in order to improve its predictive power.
(Insert Table 8 approximately here)
Robustness Tests
In this subsection we test whether the within-sample predictions are robust out-of-sample through a cross-validation. For this purpose we estimate three detection models excluding in turns LMFs confiscated in each year between 2011 and 2013 with their control firms and predicting values for each excluded hold-out sample. Related estimates and detection accuracy rates for each yearly hold-out sample are presented in Table 9 .
(Insert Table 9 approximately here)
The results indicate that the overall predictive power of the models at cut-off of 0.50 is 69.55%, 71.57% and 77.91% in the hold-out samples of LMFs confiscated in 2013, 2012 and 2011, respectively. Due to the relatively small difference from our tested model we consider that the out-of-sample tests support the robustness of our detection model.
Analysis of Undetected LMFs
We perform a further analysis of LMFs undetected by our model in order to determine whether they present some significant differences from detected LMFs. (Insert Table 10 approximately here) Table 11 presents univariate tests of differences between undetected and detected LMFs including detection model variables and two additional variables measuring firm size.
(Insert Table 11 
Conclusions
In this study we develop a logistic regression model that can contribute to the detection of LMFs in Italy based on their financial statement characteristics. Overall, our results reveal that our model is able to detect 76.29% of LMF-years (sensitivity) and 76.53% of LWF-years (specificity) within a matched sample of 852 firm-years including both LMFs and LWFs.
As a primary contribution, our paper can aid practitioners and regulators in identifying accounting signals that can be used in risk assessment models or in the detection of criminal infiltrations and related illicit practices. In particular, a high probability score resulting from the model could be used as a further selection criterion of firms to be regularly inspected in order to unmask illegal activities and as a red flag strengthening existing evidence of Mafia activities.
Indeed, because of its limitations, the model cannot by itself support allegations of Mafia infiltrations within a firm without additional proofs.
We recognize that in the future our detection model might need to be adapted to the continuous evolution of Mafia practices. Nonetheless, we do not expect any significant change in the practices of LMFs as an immediate reaction aiming to undermine the effectiveness of an auditing procedure based on our model. Indeed, LMFs are already engaged in disguising their illicit practices and the patterns disclosed by our model are a necessary consequence of these attempts. Furthermore, confiscations of LMFs are mostly based on investigations carried out by authorities on parallel illicit activities and criminal bonds of the owners that significantly benefit LMFs by granting them sources of funding and business opportunities. The imputation of the owners for mafia-type association automatically implies the confiscation of all their assets including firms. Hence, a change in the internal LMFs practices would not prevent authorities from accomplishing their investigations.
However, our findings are subject to several limitations. We cannot be completely sure that control sample LWFs are not connected to criminal organizations despite having never been confiscated. Nonetheless, considering the large population of 78,340 firms from which control sample LWFs have been selected, we assume a very low probability of a significant presence of LMFs in our control sample. Although we conduct extensive out-of-sample tests, we cannot reject the possibility that our detection model is biased because undetected LMFs are unobservable and smaller LMFs unavailable on AIDA are excluded. Furthermore, there could be selection biases in LMFs pursued by Italian authorities.
We propose several opportunities for future research. First, other detection techniques (multiple discriminant analysis, neural networks, decision trees, etc.) could be tested in order to find out whether they perform better than our logistic model. Second, additional financial and non-financial information from other sources may be considered to improve the predictive power of the model. Third, the model could be applied to other types of illegal firms such as simple tax evaders that, although not directly connected to any criminal organization, may have behavior patterns similar to LMFs. Finally, this study could be replicated in other countries, where organized crime is deeply rooted, in order to determine whether the results are confirmed in a different cultural, legal and institutional context. and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the differences in medians between paired samples. See Table 1 for variable definitions. We apply non parametric Wilcoxon Notes: * , * * and * * * denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. See Table 1 Table 7 . The ROC curve shows the relation between the proportion of LMFs detected and the proportion of false positives for all possible classification probability cut-off points. Fig.2 .This figure shows the graph of sensitivity and specificity versus probability cutoff-points.
